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Liquidity and the Drivers of Search, Due Diligence and Transaction Times for UK 
Commercial Real Estate Investments 
 
Abstract 
Trading commercial real estate involves a process of exchange that is costly and which occurs over 
an extended and uncertain period of time. This has consequences for the performance and risk of 
real estate investments. Most research on transaction times has occurred for residential rather than 
commercial real estate. We study the time taken to transact commercial real estate assets in the UK 
using a sample of 578 transactions over the period 2004 to 2013. We measure average time to 
transact from a buyer and seller perspective, distinguishing the search and due diligence phases of 
the process, and we conduct econometric analysis to explain variation in due diligence times 
between assets. The median time for purchase of real estate from introduction to completion was 
104 days and the median time for sale from marketing to completion was 135 days. There is 
considerable variation around these times and results suggest that some of this variation is related 
to market state, type and quality of asset, and type of participants involved in the transaction. Our 
findings shed light on the drivers of liquidity at an individual asset level and can inform models 
that quantify the impact of uncertain time on market on real estate investment risk. 
 
Keywords 
Time on market; Liquidity; Transaction process; Hazard models; Real estate risk 
 
1. Introduction 
Arguably, the most important characteristic of liquidity is the time it takes to complete an 
investment or convert an asset into money (Lippman & McCall, 1986). Buying and selling 
commercial real estate involves a process of exchange that occurs over an extended period 
and incurs risks and costs of a character and order that are different from many other 
investment assets. These stem from the private and dispersed nature of real estate markets 
and the fact that real estate assets are heterogeneous, with varying physical, spatial and 
legal characteristics. Buyers must spend time searching for suitable assets and sellers 
spend time attracting buyers. The nature of risk in this period is investigated by Lin & 
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Vandell (2007). Their models estimate the extent to which ex-post data on real estate 
returns understates the ex-ante risk taken by real estate investors because it does not 
account for uncertainty about the marketing period itself. However, search and marketing 
are not the only lengthy or uncertain stages of transacting, with price agreement – the 
moment a bid is accepted by a seller – being only the start of further negotiations and 
processes that are neither immediate nor without friction. 
The length and variability of transaction times has implications for investment strategies 
that can be applied to commercial real estate and renders some measures that are used in 
determining the liquidity of other assets less relevant. Measures used for financial assets 
concern not just trading volumes, but also costs of trading in terms of bid-ask spread and 
the sensitivity of prices and returns to trading. However, it can be difficult to assess these 
in the private real estate market. Even turnover is difficult to measure in the absence of 
robust information on market size while time on market is not consistently measured for 
commercial real estate assets. In contrast, studies addressing liquidity for other major 
investment assets can often assume transaction transparency and immediacy, coupled with 
low to modest transaction costs. Nonetheless, the time taken to transact, and how this 
varies between assets, is of major relevance to real estate market participants.  
Previous research (Crosby & McAllister, 2004 and Scofield, 2013) highlights significant 
variability in the time to transact commercial real estate assets; both through time and 
across cases, as well as between different stages of the process. Lin & Vandell (2007) 
provide a description of the real estate sale process in which a defining feature is the 
sequential but random arrival of offers that characterises the outcome of search by both 
buyers (for assets) and sellers (for counterparties). The uncertainty surrounding both price 
and the length of the transaction period in this process affects both the risk and returns 
from real estate investment.1 There is currently little information on whether variation 
across cases and stages is simply random or whether other features of the asset or process 
(such as the approach adopted for sale and the use and structure of brokerage) can explain 
this. 
This study explores relationships between time to transact, asset characteristics, market 
state and other features of the transaction process using a sample of nearly 600 UK 
commercial real estate transactions that took place over the period 2004-2013. To date, 
information on the time it takes to transact commercial real estate has not been collected 
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systematically in many markets. This may, in part, explain why the majority of academic 
research on transaction times has occurred for residential rather than commercial real 
estate assets. This study is based on primary data collected by the authors and it aims to 
extend knowledge on what causes variations in transaction times and so drives liquidity at 
an individual asset level. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. First, a review of relevant work on 
time to transact is presented. The review begins with theoretical insights from studies on 
time on market for residential real estate before discussing studies on time to transact in 
commercial real estate markets. After this, the data collected for this study are discussed. 
The dataset contains variables such as dates for transaction events, price, property type, 
location and counterparties. Tabular analyses of transaction times are then presented and 
these analyses are followed by econometric modelling that concentrates on variability in 
the due diligence phase of the transaction. 
The key findings are that transaction times vary markedly with market conditions, the type 
and quality of the asset being traded and the nature of the participants involved in the 
transaction. We find that average transaction times were shortest during the growth phase 
of the UK commercial real estate cycle and lengthened as market conditions deteriorated 
and prices fell after Q2 2007. However, they lengthened even further in the aftermath of 
market collapse, once the trough in prices had been reached. This suggests that both the 
direction and speed of market movement influence the number and length of commercial 
real estate transactions. More complex real estate investments such as Shopping Centres 
and portfolios of properties took longer to transact while the involvement of institutional 
investors leads to deals being concluded more rapidly.  
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1.Theoretical background 
In the residential literature, most studies of transaction times concentrate on the concept of 
time on market. This focuses on time from a seller perspective and can be defined as the 
period from first listing to deposit, though some use the phrase to define the entire sale 
process (see Benefield & Hardin, 2013). Sirmans, MacDonald & Macpherson (2010) 
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provide a meta-analysis of some of the most important studies of time on market. Our 
work considers both the search/marketing phase and the due diligence phase of the 
transaction process. In a commercial real estate context, both of these phases exhibit 
considerable uncertainty and variability in their length. 
Search models show how the time it takes to sell a property is affected by the number of 
buyers relative to the number of sellers (e.g. see Novy-Marx, 2009). More buyers mean 
more viewings and a greater chance of a successful match, but more sellers means more 
competition and dilution of buyers across available assets. A successful match depends on 
the potential buyer being willing to match or exceed the reservation price of the seller. 
Fisher, Gatzlaff, Geltner & Haurin (2004) suggest that, across all buyers, there is a 
distribution of potential bids while, across all sellers, there is a distribution of reservation 
prices. The extent of the overlap between these distributions will determine the amount of 
market activity. This overlap should be greater in strong markets if buyer prices rise more 
rapidly with changing market conditions, and Clayton, MacKinnon & Peng (2008) discuss 
why this might be expected. Thus, holding constant the number of sellers, assets should 
sell more rapidly owing to more buyers and a greater probability of making a match. 
However, sellers could adjust their reservation prices upwards as a boom progresses and 
more sellers may enter the market, altering the balance between buyers and sellers once 
more. Therefore, the relationship between market conditions and transaction times could 
be complex. Yet residential studies report average transaction times that are shorter during 
strong markets (Pryce & Gibb, 2006; Carrillo, 2013). Hence, we expect that the strength 
or otherwise of the market is likely to have an important effect on transaction times, with 
faster times in stronger market conditions. We also expect that the element of time most 
likely to be affected is the search phase. We anticipate that average due diligence times 
would remain the same unless, in strong markets, buyers reduce the amount of due 
diligence that they carry out. 
The residential literature also draws attention to the relationship between pricing strategies 
and time to transact. For example, if a seller sets too high a reservation price relative to the 
asset's true value, then the asset is likely to stay on the market longer. Conversely, if the 
seller sets too low a reservation price, then an asset is likely to trade more quickly. Highly 
motivated sellers may set lower reservation prices to ensure that they get access to capital 
quickly, e.g. distressed sellers. Hence, potentially, prices and transaction times are 
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endogenous, with implications for econometric modelling. Studies that consider the 
characteristics and motivations of sellers with reference to the sale of single family homes 
include Anglin (2006) and Glower, Haurin & Hendershott (1998). It should be noted that 
the mix of market participants can change over time and in connection with market state. 
Buyer and seller circumstances are likely to matter in commercial real estate markets as 
well, but the nature of the participants and their circumstances differs considerably from 
the residential arena. Firm level processes and organisational dynamics are more likely to 
affect transaction times. For example, internal ‘buying centres’ are expected to be similar 
within the same type of investors. These investment firms will cast individuals in similar 
investment roles and transactions will occur within similar organisational structures, with 
similar authorities, status and rewards, utilizing similar subsystems of communication 
(Webster & Wind, 1972, as cited in Gallimore, McAllister & Hughes, 2006). When 
similar investor types transact, similar internal organization and related processes might 
encourage more efficient transactions between these groups. 
Furthermore, private real estate markets provide sellers with an informational advantage 
relative to buyers. Research and due diligence by buyers attempts to eliminate this, but 
this incurs costs. These costs rise when buyers lack market familiarity. In particular, non-
domestic investors may suffer from informational disadvantages as compared to their 
domestic counterparts. However, investors and others may use brokers to mitigate 
information differences and acquire assets faster, though this does increase the cost of the 
transaction. The role and use of brokers or agents varies across markets (Devaney & 
Scofield, 2013), but, in principle, they should facilitate search and may also offer advice to 
facilitate the due diligence process, making transactions more efficient. For example, 
Baryla & Zumpano (1995) find for residential property that brokers increase buyer search 
intensity, reducing actual search time.2 
Finally, early research considered the impact of housing quality on selling time (Cubbin, 
1974)  and the literature has since considered this and related issues such as the effects of 
atypical characteristics on transaction times (Haurin, 1988; Haurin, Haurin, Nadauld & 
Sanders, 2010). More complex or unusual assets take longer to sell since fewer buyers 
lead to longer marketing periods while complexity increases the necessary due diligence 
relating to ownership, use or other attributes of the asset. What makes for a complex or 
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unusual commercial real estate investment is likely to differ from the case of a residential 
property, but we expect the general insight to remain valid.  
2.2.Empirical research on commercial real estate 
Early treatment of the relationship between transaction time and price for commercial real 
estate investments comes from Trippi (1977). His work posits that sellers of real estate 
face two conflicting objectives: maximising price whilst minimising transaction time. This 
creates “ceteris paribus, a clearly defined trade-off between expected time to sell and the 
capitalization rate (r = income/price)” (1977: 838). Trippi models these assumptions using 
a Cobb-Douglas production function in which price and time form a single dependent 
component, while factors relating to the economic environment, the age of the structure, 
the number of rental units and quality rankings based on location and appearance form a 
second set of variables. The work finds that higher capitalisation rates are associated with 
shortened expected time to sale. 
McNamara (1998) explored the acquisition and sale process for UK commercial real estate 
through a survey of investment principals and agents directly involved in transacting 
commercial real estate on behalf of institutional investors. He noted three key points in the 
transaction process – heads of terms/price agreement, exchange and completion – and 
used these to define three stages in that process: either search (buyer) or marketing 
(seller), due diligence and settlement. He then reported indicative times for these stages. A 
seller was judged to need 4-6 weeks to find a buyer for high street retail units versus 6-8 
weeks for offices and 7-9 weeks for shopping centres. Due diligence ranged from 4-6 
weeks for high street retail through to 12 weeks for shopping centres. On the buy side, 
similar patterns were reported, though with longer times to allow for search and selection 
of appropriate assets. 
McNamara notes a further difference between commercial and residential real estate 
investment: the role of income and associated opportunity costs of capital. He compared 
real estate liquidity to that of equities and developed a model of the opportunity costs 
incurred during time on market. This work demonstrates that buyers and sellers of real 
estate incur differential opportunity costs concomitant with time to transact. Time on 
market illiquidity is “a two tailed problem” affecting buyers and sellers differentially 
(1998: 17). Yet the study found little evidence that investors in commercial real estate – 
whether buying or selling – were adjusting prices to reflect opportunity costs. 
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Johnson, Wiley & Zhonghua (2007) examine 956 office sales from across 39 US markets 
using data from CoStar. The average time on market for their sample is reported to be 260 
days (over eight months). They find that lower grade properties with higher square footage 
take longer to transact and that longer marketing times correlate with price discounts. The 
authors posit that the lack of similar studies on commercial real estate in the literature is 
because these assets continue to produce income for their owners during the sale process, 
mitigating any capital loss associated with time on market. However, the consequence to 
an investor of a delay in transacting is that it narrows the band of subsequent investment 
opportunities (Hicks, 1974, as cited in Lippman & McCall, 1986: 54) and will affect their 
ability to use capital efficiently and so meet operational requirements.3 This important 
observation coincides with McNamara’s insights regarding opportunity costs. 
Crosby & McAllister (2004) provide further evidence for UK commercial real estate. 
They focused on the sell side of the transaction and measured average times per stage of 
the sale process using data on 187 transactions collected from the records of three major 
real estate investors for the periods 1995-1996 and 2000-2002. The authors adapted 
McNamara’s stages of the sale process, expanding these to six: decision to sell sector, 
decision to sell asset, pre-marketing, marketing, due diligence and exchange to 
completion. Their paper marked the first attempt to analyse data collected directly from 
transaction principals. 
Crosby & McAllister highlight the importance of stages prior to marketing, as it is here 
that specific assets are selected and prepared for sale, but the length of these stages is very 
difficult to quantify. Working from the first record of sale, which sometimes predated 
formal marketing, the mean transaction time was found to be more than nine months and 
the median time to be more than six months in length. The authors noted considerable 
variability in the time to transact and that this not only affected the marketing stage, but 
also the due diligence stages of the transaction. They found that “few generalisations can 
be made concerning the causes of longer and shorter transaction times”, but to 
disaggregate and analyse further “the sample size needs to increase and the number of 
funds and range of ownership also needs to increase” (2004: 36-37). 
Bond, Hwang, Lin & Vandell (2007) note how uncertainty and variability in time to 
transact is an important element of the ex-ante risk of real estate investment. They model 
this risk using the framework set out in Lin & Vandell (2007) and the empirical data of 
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Crosby & McAllister (2004). They argue that uncertainty around the time needed to sell 
assets prompts risk mitigation strategies such as longer holding periods and a minimum 
number of assets held in a portfolio. In addition to uncertainty about the time it takes to 
liquidate real estate, there is a comparable risk to investors of being unable to place capital 
when required to meet redemption and consumption demands in other areas of the 
investment portfolio. Moreover, holding period and market state at the time of sale are 
also important (see also Lin & Vandell, 2007; Lin, Liu & Vandell, 2009). 
Hordijk & Teuben (2008) provide evidence on transaction times for the Netherlands, also 
focusing on sellers. They conducted interviews with brokerage firms and gathered 
evidence on 512 real estate transactions occurring between 1995 and 2002. They did not 
conduct any econometric analysis despite their relatively large sample. Instead, they tabled 
average times by sector, year of sale and value of the sale concerned. They also discuss the 
opportunity costs arising from delays in real estate transacting. 
Finally, Scofield (2013) tests for changes in median transaction times by analysing buy 
side data sourced from transaction principals alongside sell side data collected by Crosby 
& McAllister (2004). The buy side data relates to 115 purchases between 2005 and 2008. 
Scofield concentrates on the due diligence stages of the transaction, so that comparative 
analysis of changes in time to transact can be made between the periods represented in 
these studies. He shows that time to transact varies with overall market activity: greater 
transaction volume and steadily rising returns are found to be significantly associated with 
shorter times from the point of price agreement to deal completion. However, results were 
based on a comparatively small number of transactions and the present study significantly 
increases the evidence base, allowing a deeper analysis to be conducted. 
 
3. Data 
To facilitate new analysis of transaction times for commercial real estate, primary data 
collection took place during late 2013. Different investment organisations were asked if 
they could supply dates for key stages in the transaction process for deals where they acted 
either as buyer or seller. Key dates were defined by the authors based on prior research by 
McNamara (1998), Crosby & McAllister (2004) and Scofield (2013). For purchases, these 
were the date on which the asset was first introduced, the date on which price was agreed, 
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the date that solicitors were instructed, the date when contracts were exchanged and the 
date of completion. For sales, the same dates were sought except that introduction date 
was replaced by the date on which the asset was first marketed. 
The dates requested relate to easily identifiable landmarks in the transaction process. Yet 
it is likely that the time between the first and the last date will understate the total time 
involved in transacting given that buyers must search for suitable assets while sellers must 
spend time selecting and preparing assets for sale before placing them on the market. 
However, timings for these activities are much harder to quantify. For example, in the case 
of institutional investors, there is often a rolling programme of introductions whereby they 
receive information from brokers about different opportunities on a regular basis. Thus, 
defining a date when search began that can be related to each specific purchase may be 
impossible. In contrast, data contributors could identify a specific date of introduction 
fairly easily. 
Data from Real Capital Analytics/Property Data (RCA/PD) was used first to identify the 
most frequent buyers and sellers of UK investment grade real estate over the last decade 
and this provided a sampling frame from which enquiries were made. This list was 
supplemented with names of other organisations in which the authors had contacts. 
Twenty-four organisations were approached, of which seven provided data for this study. 
Those responding with data included insurance companies, fund management houses and 
real estate investment trusts. Furthermore, similar information on purchases collected by 
Scofield (2013) was reused in this exercise. Two additional organisations are represented 
in the data collected by Scofield, raising the number of contributing firms to nine.  
To assist with data collection, a template was supplied by the authors to each firm which 
showed a list of variables desired for this study. The templates were prepopulated with a 
list of deals involving those firms (either as buyers or sellers) and this was achieved with 
reference to data supplied by RCA/PD – itself based on information in the public domain. 
Firms were then asked to provide data relating primarily to the dates noted above, but also 
about other asset and transaction features if not already captured by RCA/PD, such as the 
capitalisation rate or counterparties involved.4 Although it facilitated responses, a potential 
issue with prepopulating the templates in this way is that it placed the focus on successful 
deals, but time lost in aborted transactions may be of interest as well. Contributors could 
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report additional transactions, if they wished, and did so in some instances, but only two 
aborted transactions in total were captured. 
Table 1 shows the size of the dataset assembled for this study. It comprises 303 purchases 
and 280 sales spanning the period 2004 to 2013.  Five transactions were duplicates in the 
sense that they were bought and sold between data contributors and reported by both 
parties. Allowing for these instances, 578 transactions are captured representing £15.7 
billion of expenditure. 542 of these transactions were sales of individual properties while 
36 transactions related to portfolios. The three main sectors of the UK commercial real 
estate market are all represented in the dataset. There were 237 retail, 194 office and 124 
industrial transactions, as well as 23 deals involving other property types. The sample size 
for each sector broadly reflects the size and structure of the UK commercial real estate 
investment market (see IPF, 2014). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Table 2 presents information on how complete the different fields are within the dataset. 
Sector, location and price are all 100% complete, as are type of buyer for the purchases 
and type of seller for the sales. Information on the counterparties was also relatively 
complete and this facilitated the construction of variables that described the type of 
organisation and nationality of the counterparty in each case. This step was guided by the 
classification scheme used by RCA/PD to determine the nature and sources of capital for 
real estate transactions. Capitalisation rate and floorspace are both fairly complete, but the 
situation with dates is more variable. Nonetheless, two or more dates were reported for 
each of the 578 transactions and this meant that the time in days for at least part, if not all 
of the transaction process could be measured in each case.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
From Table 2, it can be seen that completion date is reported in all cases. The date when 
solicitors were instructed is the next most populated, followed by date of exchange. Other 
dates are then less well populated. However, in cases where both date of price agreement 
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and the date when solicitors were instructed were available, the difference between them 
was very small, with a median distance of only one day. Nor was it uncommon for the 
instruction of solicitors to happen on the same day as price agreement. For this reason, a 
new date variable was created once data collection had been completed and this equalled 
the date of price agreement, if available, or the solicitor instruction date in other cases. 
This allowed the analysis to focus on two key phases in particular: time from either 
introduction or marketing of the asset to price/solicitor and time from price/solicitor to 
completion. This helped to utilise the available data more effectively. 
 
4. Results 
We now report the length of different stages in the transaction process as measured from 
our sample. After reviewing all purchases and all sales, the dataset is disaggregated to 
explore how transaction times vary with factors such as market state, property type, price 
and counterparty. Table 3 provides summary statistics for transaction times both in terms 
of total time measured for purchases and sales and the length of the two major stages in 
each case relating to the periods before and after price agreement. It reports the number of 
transactions on which average times are based, two measures of average time (mean and 
median) and the standard deviation in transaction time as a measure of spread around the 
mean. The table also reports skewness and kurtosis, which indicate that the distributions of 
times are strongly peaked and positively skewed. As such, a normal distribution is easily 
rejected in all cases. This matches the findings of Bond et al. (2007: 453) in relation to the 
data that they used. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
For purchases, the stage from introduction to price agreement/instruction of solicitors has 
a median length of 35 days, or just over one month, and was not usually longer than three 
months. The period from price agreement/instruction of solicitors to completion was then 
longer, with a median length of 56 days. Within this time, the due diligence period up to 
exchange of contracts was more lengthy than the period required for settlement. Exchange 
to completion typically took a week and there were a few instances (45 cases) where these 
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two events occurred on the same day. Total time from introduction to completion of a 
purchase, where this could be measured, suggests a typical timespan of over 100 days or 
around three and half months. 
For sales, the stage from initial marketing to price agreement/instruction of solicitors has a 
median length of 42 days, or about one and half months, but could be as long as six 
months or more. The period from price agreement/instruction of solicitors through to 
completion was then longer, with a median length of 64 days, though there is considerable 
variation around this figure. Once again, within this time, the due diligence period up to 
exchange of contracts was normally longer than the time needed for settlement. Finally, 
the total time from initial marketing to completion of a purchase, where this could be 
measured, exhibited a median figure of 135 days, or around four and half months. 
Patterns in the sales data are broadly consistent with those in the purchases data. The first 
stage is longer for sales, which is unsurprising given that this includes time spent on the 
market before introduction to the successful buyer. What is surprising is that the median is 
only one week longer, though there is a larger difference when total time is compared. 
There are also substantial variations around the average times. Graphs that show the 
distributions of transaction time, including times for each stage, are provided in the 
appendix. These distributions are all similar in shape: positively skewed with a tail of 
instances in which lengthy delays occurred. There are no significant correlations (either 
positive or negative) between the times taken for different stages. For instance, a long 
marketing period is not necessarily followed by a long due diligence phase. 
As noted earlier, a key influence on variations in transaction times is likely to be market 
state, as this should influence the numbers of buyers and sellers. The number of potential 
buyers or sellers is not easy to quantify and is often proxied by transaction volumes or 
other information on market conditions. One assumption would be that, in deteriorating 
markets, there are fewer buyers relative to sellers and so prices fall and fewer transactions 
take place. Hence, market state was defined with reference to turning points in price and 
capital value indices. The IPD UK quarterly capital growth index peaked in Q2 2007 and 
then fell before reaching a trough in Q2 2009. Similarly, the RCA/PD UK Commercial 
Property Price Index peaked in Q2 2007 and bottomed out in Q2 2009. With reference to 
these series, four market phases were defined: Boom (up to June 2007), Downturn (from 
July 2007 to June 2009), Recovery (from July 2009 to June 2011) and Recent (July 2011 
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onwards). Transactions were then grouped into one of those four periods based on their 
date of completion.5  
Table 4 shows the median times for key transaction stages according to the market state in 
which the transaction completed. For this and subsequent tables, only the price/solicitor to 
completion stage is shown for sales because a lack of data for the marketing stage prevents 
disaggregation. In the final row of the table, results from a non-parametric test of whether 
median times for different periods are significantly different from each other are reported. 
In this test, the null hypothesis is that no difference exists between the median times for 
each group of transactions.6 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
The figures indicate that average transaction times lengthened as the downturn began and 
then continued to lengthen during the recovery. This seems to be driven by the phase prior 
to price agreement and the differences in median times relating to this phase are found to 
be highly statistically significant. It may be surprising that there is not a starker transition 
between boom and downturn. However, some deals that completed during the downturn 
had already reached price agreement in the boom phase. In these cases, the initial phase of 
the transaction was rapid, contributing to a shorter than expected overall transaction time. 
Furthermore, the dataset largely ignores withdrawn or aborted transactions. According to 
proprietary RCA/PD data, the proportion of aborted deals rose over the course of 2008 and 
peaked during 2009. Thus, liquidity will have reduced more in the downturn than these 
figures on transaction times indicate since time lost in aborted transactions has not been 
captured in the measurements above. 
Other possible sources of variation relate to property type. Table 5 shows results for the 
main sectors of the UK commercial real estate market and for assets in sectors outside the 
UK investment mainstream. Furthermore, given wide variation within the retail sector in 
the nature and scale of assets, figures were computed for segments such as retail parks, 
shopping centres and supermarkets. Standard shops and individual retail warehouses are 
the types of retail property that progress most rapidly from introduction to price agreement 
while shopping centres take the longest, though, surprisingly, the differences are not found 
to be statistically significant in this instance. In contrast, differences in median time for 
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introduction to completion are significant with the total time being longest for shopping 
centres, while individual retail warehouses take least time to transact. Similar relativities 
between types of retail were reported in McNamara (1998). 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Price might also influence transaction times, but the relationship between time and price is 
complex, since time spent on the market could affect the eventual price that is accepted by 
a seller. Furthermore, a confounding factor arises from the fact that the transactions are 
spread over a number of years. Therefore, some properties may appear to be more 
valuable than others simply because they were sold in a stronger market. To address this 
second point, the price for each asset was adjusted for capital growth between the quarter 
in which they traded and Q4 2012, which was used as a base point. The indices used for 
this adjustment were the RCA/PD UK Commercial Property Price Indices.7  
In Table 6, purchases and sales are segmented into price bands, using the adjusted prices 
and thresholds of £5 million, £10 million, £20 million and £50 million. For this analysis, 
portfolio deals were removed as these typically concluded at prices of £20 million or 
higher and might distort the results. There appears to be some relationship between price 
and time to transact, with longer times for higher priced assets, though this difference is 
only significant when examining the initial phase of the transaction. Table 6 also presents 
results from an exercise to distinguish assets of different quality. Samples of purchases 
and sales were each split into quartile groups, based on their achieved price per square 
foot (in Q4 2012 terms) relative to other properties in the same sector. The test focuses 
only on properties in the retail, office and industrial sectors and the results suggest that 
lower quality properties within each sector are associated with longer times to transact. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Finally, for purchases, Table 7 records median times to transact, based on the nature of the 
counterparty (seller) that the purchasers were dealing with. Two distinctions are noted: a 
difference between UK and non-UK sellers and a difference between institutional 
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investors, such as insurance companies, fund management houses and pension funds, and 
other types of sellers, such as private property companies, private investors and non-
investing organisations, such as owner-occupiers or government bodies. Meanwhile, an 
unknown group in each case captures deals where the identity or nationality of the seller 
concerned had not been recorded. The results suggest that domestic organisations and 
investment institutions are quicker to transact with than other types of sellers, with the 
differences for institutions versus other sellers being significant across all transaction 
stages. A similar analysis of the sales data (not reported) supports these suggestions. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
5. Econometric analysis 
Multivariate modelling was conducted to see which factors explain transaction times after 
controlling for the influence of other variables. The quantity and depth of available data is 
an important consideration for such modelling. Most of the data relates to the time from 
price agreement/instruction of solicitors to completion of the transaction and not the time 
from either marketing or introduction date to completion. The stage from price agreement 
onwards differs from the classic concept of time on market and measures the efficiency of 
the processes required to conclude a sale (Benefield & Hardin, 2013). The analysis so far 
suggests that this stage is as lengthy and variable as earlier stages of the transaction 
process and so drivers of variations in the time taken here are of considerable interest as 
they still impact on the liquidity of the assets concerned.8 
Where time is a dependent variable, there can often be violations of the assumptions under 
which Ordinary Least Squares techniques are effective. The alternative techniques for 
modelling time can be classified into parametric, semi-parametric and non-parametric 
techniques. The residential literature has often used parametric models to explore the 
determinants of time on market. Such models can be very effective, but they make 
assumptions about the underlying behaviour of the time variable in question. Uncritical 
use of parametric models is criticised by Pryce & Gibb (2006), who highlight that time on 
market data can violate the assumptions of the most commonly used models. Bearing this 
in mind, analysis was conducted here to understand the best approach to modelling the 
data available. 
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Non-parametric modelling was used first to explore the nature of the time data for each 
transaction stage, including the price to completion stage that is modelled below. This 
analysis started with the estimation of survivor and hazard functions. Beginning from a 
probability of 1 at time t=0, a survivor function plots how likely it is that properties 
‘survive’ beyond time t, where ‘survival’ means that the asset remains on the market or 
the deal remains uncompleted. For the price to completion stage, date of price agreement 
represents t=0 in the analysis and each observation ‘fails’ at a time greater than zero, when 
the sale is formally completed. The hazard function then plots the probability of 
completion occurring within a given time interval, conditional on survival up to that point. 
Our dataset contains observations of times from both a seller and a buyer perspective. 
These observations should be compatible for the period from price/solicitor date to 
completion as this stage is shared by both in a way that earlier stages in the transaction 
process are not. Thus, observations of price to completion times were pooled prior to 
analysis and the hazard function estimated on the combined data for this stage.9 This 
hazard function is displayed in Figure 1. The shape echoes the distribution of the raw data 
shown in appendix 1, with the probability that completion is achieved rising at first and 
then falling as time passes. As such, survival models that rely on the hazard function being 
constant over time (exponential model) or consistently rising or falling (Weibull model) 
can be ruled out. 
  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Therefore, regression modelling took place using a semi-parametric technique: the Cox 
proportional hazards model. Further tests of whether data from the purchases and sales 
were compatible rejected the hypothesis of an identical hazard function between these 
samples, though without changing the conclusions in regard to shape. Thus, stratified Cox 
models were estimated that enable the baseline hazard function for the two groups of 
observations to differ. The models also allow for possible correlations in measured price 
to completion times between deals reported by the same firm. Such correlations might 
arise from differences in transaction processes between organisations having an influence 
on times or from measurement errors common to a particular firm, e.g. if one contributor 
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defined the price agreement date somewhat differently to another when completing the 
survey. 
Independent variables were then chosen to try to explain variations in the time from price 
to completion. To test the influence of market conditions, we measure the average rate of 
price growth between the price/solicitor date and completion date for each transaction 
using the RCA/PD Commercial Property Price Indices.10 The continuous variable that this 
generates captures market performance over the period when due diligence occurred, with 
a spline used to allow for different relationships in rising versus falling markets. In effect, 
the spline splits the market performance indicator into two variables: the first records the 
average price growth in cases where this is positive and reports a zero otherwise while the 
second reports average price growth where negative and zero otherwise. This proved more 
effective in explaining variations in transaction times than using dummy variables for 
different market states.  
In contrast, price worked poorly, whether as a continuous variable or via dummies based 
on the price bands defined earlier. An issue noted already is that price can be endogenous, 
i.e. it affects transaction time and also may be affected by how long an asset has been on 
the market. For example, price may be reduced if a vendor considers that their asset has 
been on the market for too long. In the case of the stage from price agreement, though, the 
presence of endogeneity is less certain. In principle, price has been determined by this 
point and so should be exogenous, but renegotiations can occur in some instances where 
due diligence reveals unforeseen problems or where new events have occurred, e.g. tenant 
insolvency (Crosby & McAllister, 2004). It is not known whether there are any instances 
of renegotiation in the data provided whereby the price supplied was not that which was 
originally agreed, but this possibility, together with its poor performance during tests led 
to the omission of a price variable from the final models. 
However, price per square foot was utilised as a variable based on the quartile groups 
defined earlier, which were used to form dummy variables that act as proxies for asset 
quality. Other dummy variables identify whether an observation is a portfolio transaction 
and whether there are unusual legal features with the asset being traded. In the UK, these 
include non-freehold tenure and/or a partial interest in the property, whereas such features 
may be more common in other real estate investment markets. Further dummy variables 
were used for property type (with standard retail being the base group), buyer and seller 
18 
 
nationalities (UK or non-UK/unknown) and type of buyer and seller (financial institution 
or other/unknown).  
Results from five models are presented in Table 8. The first two models present output 
from standard Cox proportional hazards model for price to completion times using sale 
observations and purchase observations, respectively. Given the findings for the hazard 
functions reported earlier, the third model is then a stratified Cox proportional hazards 
model that uses both seller and buyer observations for price to completion times. The 
fourth and fifth models are also stratified models based on the combined sample, but 
which isolate and examine observations for the retail and the office sector, respectively. 
For these two models, additional dummies that specified detailed asset type or location 
were substituted for the sector indicators. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
 
As is common for survival models, output is presented in terms of hazard ratios rather 
than coefficients. Essentially, there is a baseline level of hazard for each time interval, and 
independent variables may increase or decrease that level of hazard. An increased level of 
hazard means an increased likelihood of completion in each interval, which should 
translate into a faster time. Thus, hazard ratios report the shift in hazard relative to the 
baseline. A ratio below 1 means reduced likelihood of completion while a ratio above 1 
means increased likelihood. So if the reported hazard ratio is 1.1, completion is 10% more 
likely within each interval for a unit increase in the variable in question. The table also 
reports the number of observations that were modelled given the availability of the 
independent variables. 
Table 8 contains several interesting findings. First, all models indicate that market state 
has a very important influence on the length of the stage from price to completion. The 
results also suggest that this impact differs between up and down markets. In an up 
market, stronger price growth raises the likelihood of reaching completion more quickly. 
In a down market, though, it is stronger falls in prices that are associated with faster 
completions. This point might be difficult to understand at first sight, but, drawing on the 
literature review, a strong downward market movement can alter the mix of buyers and 
sellers, with some sellers compelled to sell and sell quickly, e.g. unit trusts to meet 
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redemptions (Crosby, Lizieri & McAllister, 2010). Thus, in markets that are moving 
rapidly up or down, buyers and sellers move more quickly to completion once they agree 
to transact. 
Other hazard ratios suggest that portfolio transactions are less likely to reach completion 
quickly, which matches our hypothesis about the impact of transaction complexity on due 
diligence times. Similarly, investments that do not provide 100% freehold ownership to 
the buyer are less likely to reach completion quickly. Transactions of all property types 
relative to the base group of standard retail are less likely to complete quickly, with the 
exception of standalone retail warehouses, which are separately identified in the retail 
sector model. This makes sense as offices, shopping centres and retail parks are all more 
likely to be multi-tenanted, increasing the amount of tenant-related due diligence that is 
required. However, assets adjudged to be in the top quartile for price paid per square foot 
have a higher probability of completing more rapidly, although this variable is only 
significant in models 1 and 5. Finally, the buyer and seller type variables suggest that 
institutional investor involvement, especially on the buy side, leads to the due diligence 
phase being concluded more quickly than in the case of other types of counterparty. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Liquidity is a key consideration for investors in real estate, with high liquidity enabling 
them to convert either cash into assets or assets into cash quickly in order to capitalize on 
investment opportunities. Our study provides up-to-date measurements of the time taken 
to acquire or sell UK commercial real estate based on an extensive primary data collection 
exercise. We measure the time taken for different stages of the transaction process and 
explore the relationships between time to transact, asset characteristics, market state and 
the nature of the investors involved. Our findings extend knowledge on what causes 
variations in commercial real estate transaction times and thus what drives liquidity at the 
individual asset level, especially with respect to the due diligence phase of transactions.  
For the sample of purchases, the median time taken from introduction of an asset through 
to completion of a deal was 104 days or between three and four months. On the sell side, 
the median time from initial marketing to completion was 135 days or four to five months. 
Considerable variation exists around these averages and they omit the time that buyers 
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spend searching for suitable assets and sellers spend in selecting and preparing assets for 
sale. However, for what we can measure, we find evidence of asset, market and clientele 
factors having a significant influence on the time taken to transact. For instance, sales 
involving institutional buyers and acquisitions involving institutional sellers were more 
likely to transact faster. Further research into the internal organisation of actors in this 
investor group may facilitate a better understanding of how the organisation of investment 
can create efficiencies that manifest in shorter transaction times. 
Another finding is that market state has a strong influence on time to transact. Drawing on 
theory, we expect that transaction times will be driven by the relative number of buyers 
and sellers, with market state likely to both affect and reflect this balance. In particular, 
weaker markets are likely to contain fewer potential buyers, which should lead to longer 
transaction times. However, our tabular and econometric analyses indicate that speed of 
market movement may also be a factor. Those deals that progressed to completion in a 
falling market from mid-2007 took less time on average than subsequent transactions that 
completed around and following the trough in real estate prices in mid-2009. Yet, the 
relationship to liquidity is complex as the mix and motivations of sellers in such markets 
become important, as does the frequency of aborted transactions, which are not reflected 
in the data we have available. 
In line with expectations, we also found that more complex real estate investments took 
longer to transact. Shopping centres took longer to transact than other types of property, 
while standard retail units and standalone retail warehouses transacted more quickly. In 
the same vein, portfolio deals were less likely to complete rapidly compared to deals for 
individual assets. This may, in part, reflect the increased due diligence necessary when 
investors acquire multiple properties in one transaction. Our analysis of due diligence 
times suggests that the quality of the asset is also important, with this serving to increase 
the probability of reaching completion more rapidly. However, price itself was not found 
to be a significant determinant of time to transact when tested alongside other factors and 
so was omitted from our final models. 
Although our study goes further than previous commercial real estate studies in terms of 
isolating asset, market and investor factors that influence time to transact, there are some 
areas that require more investigation. For example, the relationship between asking price, 
achieved price and transaction time is one such area and better data on marketing times, in 
21 
 
particular, would facilitate such exploration. The influence of financing and brokerage on 
the speed of different transaction stages are other examples. In the case of brokers, we 
assume that their role in a transaction should affect the time taken significantly. Yet the 
nature of brokerage varies between markets and, in some markets, the use of brokers or 
agents may be ubiquitous, making the detection of any impacts difficult. However, in all 
of these cases, the key challenge is that there is often no systematic tracking of transaction 
times for commercial real estate assets. Thus, improvements in the collection of this type 
of data are essential in order for research and analysis to progress further. 
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Notes 
1 This is explored further by Cheng, Lin & Liu (2010, 2013), Lin & Liu (2008) and 
Lin, Liu & Vandell (2009). 
2 It is possible that the decision to use a broker is another aspect that is endogenous. 
Depending on market practice, a seller may only instruct a broker if they suspect 
that buyers may be difficult to find while a buyer may only instruct their own 
representative if search or negotiations become difficult. We thank an anonymous 
reviewer for highlighting this to us. 
3 These requirements could include the placing or withdrawal of capital on behalf of 
new or departing unitholders, as in the case of open-ended funds, or reinvestment to 
help meet future liabilities, as in the case of pension funds. 
4 The template also asked contributors about the method of sale used and how deals 
were financed, but these were not reported often enough for these variables to be 
included in this study. 
5 An alternative might be to define market conditions with reference to transaction 
volumes. Data provided by RCA/PD indicate that the amount of trading peaked 
around Q2 2007, but the trough in activity was slightly earlier than the trough in 
prices, being Q1 2009 in terms of number of deals and Q4 2008 by value traded. 
6 The absence of a significant difference does not necessarily mean that a particular 
factor is unimportant. The result may be driven by small samples or by the presence 
of confounding factors, an issue that is tackled in the multivariate modelling. 
7 Properties were matched to the most appropriate index in this family. The UK Retail 
index was used for retail properties while the Central London Office and UK ex-
London Office were used for offices in those locations. For industrial and other 
property types, the aggregate UK Commercial series was used. Note that analyses 
using unadjusted prices produced similar results. 
8 Using purchases, several models of the stage from introduction to price agreement / 
instruction of solicitors were tested, but these did not yield convincing results owing 
to the much smaller samples available. 
9 This and subsequent modelling excludes assets from outside the retail, office and 
industrial sectors as well as one transaction with a time greater than one and a half 
years from price agreement to completion. 
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10 Once again, properties were matched to the most appropriate index in this family. 
As a robustness check, we also tested the IPD UK Quarterly Property Index (an 
appraisal based index) as the measure of market performance, matching each asset 
to the appropriate sector index. The regression results obtained were substantively 
similar to those presented in Table 8. 
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Appendix: Distribution of times for different transaction stages 
 
INSERT FIGURES A1 TO A6 HERE 
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Figure 1: Estimate of hazard function for period from price agreement to completion 
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Figure A1: Purchases – Distribution of time in days from introduction to price/solicitor date 
 
Figure A2: Purchases – Distribution of time in days from price/solicitor date to completion 
 
Figure A3: Purchases – Distribution of time in days from introduction to completion 
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Figure A4: Sales – Distribution of time in days from marketing to price/solicitor date 
 
Figure A5: Sales – Distribution of time in days from price/solicitor date to completion 
 
Figure A6: Sales – Distribution of time in days from marketing to completion 
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Table 1: Number and value of transactions in the sample over time 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Purchases 1 21 48 49 16 20 38 42 53 15 303 
Sales  13 30 26 26 40 29 42 42 32 280 
Adjustment        -1 -3 -1 -5 
All transactions 1 34 78 75 42 60 67 83 92 46 578 
Amount in £m 18 679 1,515 2,671 1,175 1,552 1,560 2,062 2,830 1,663 15,724 
 
 
Table 2: Completeness of different variables in the dataset 
 Purchases Sales 
 Observed Absent % complete Observed Absent % complete 
Introduction date 141 162 47% n/a n/a n/a 
Marketing date n/a n/a n/a 43 237 15% 
Price agreement date 114 189 38% 66 214 24% 
Date solicitor instructed 272 31 90% 245 35 88% 
Date of exchange 225 78 74% 207 73 74% 
Completion date 303 0 100% 280 0 100% 
       
Sector 303 0 100% 280 0 100% 
Region 303 0 100% 280 0 100% 
Price 303 0 100% 280 0 100% 
Capitalisation rate 222 81 73% 228 52 81% 
Floorspace sq. ft. 249 54 82% 252 28 90% 
Buyer nationality 303 0 100% 245 35 88% 
Buyer type 303 0 100% 245 35 88% 
Buyer broker 206 97 68% 197 83 70% 
Seller nationality 254 49 84% 280 0 100% 
Seller type 254 49 84% 280 0 100% 
Seller broker 183 120 60% 226 54 81% 
 
  
32 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics – time in days for different transaction stages 
 Obs. Median Mean St. dev Skew Kurtosis JB stat 
Purchases        
Introduction to price/solicitor 127 35 63 83 3.01 12.6 678.4 
Price/solicitor to completion 289 56 74 63 2.60 11.7 1240.5 
Introduction to completion 141 104 144 107 1.79 5.75 119.8 
Sales        
Marketing to price/solicitor 35 42 75 87 2.28 7.85 64.6 
Price/solicitor to completion 271 64 92 88 2.59 12.1 1237.6 
Marketing to completion 43 135 165 131 1.76 5.60 34.4 
        
Measurements of means, medians, etc. are based on different sized samples. Thus, results for introduction to price/solicitor and for 
price/solicitor to completion will not sum to time from introduction to completion. Similarly, results for marketing to price/solicitor 
and for price/solicitor to completion will not sum to time from marketing to completion. 
 
 
Table 4: Median times in days for key transaction stages by market state 
 Purchases Sales 
 Introduction to 
Price/Sol 
Price/Sol to 
Completion 
Introduction to 
Completion 
Price/Sol to 
Completion 
Boom to June 2007 29 55 88 63 
Downturn to June 2009 32 60 117 61 
Recovery to June 2011 67 50 145 50 
July 2011 to mid-2013 51 59 122 81 
P-value: medians are equal 0.001 0.261 0.028 0.048 
     
Measurements of medians are based on different sized samples. Results for introduction to price/solicitor and for 
price/solicitor to completion will not sum to time from introduction to completion. 
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Table 5: Median times in days for key transaction stages by type of property 
 Purchases Sales 
 Introduction to 
Price/Sol 
Price/Sol to 
Completion 
Introduction to 
Completion 
Price/Sol to 
Completion 
Retail 39 52 95 58 
Office 32 53 102 73 
Industrial 36 69 122 62 
Other 31 79 143 - 
P-value: medians are equal 0.612 0.005 0.190 0.202 
Standard Retail 28 46 96 48 
Retail Park 43 55 95 57 
Retail Warehouse 25 33 56 56 
Shopping Centre 160 58 222 101 
Supermarket 69 60 128 - 
P-value: medians are equal 0.152 0.034 0.021 0.010 
     
Measurements of medians are based on different sized samples. Results for introduction to price/solicitor and for 
price/solicitor to completion will not sum to time from introduction to completion. 
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Table 6: Median times in days for key transaction stages by price band and for quartile groups based on 
price per square foot 
 Purchases Sales 
 Introduction to 
Price/Sol 
Price/Sol to 
Completion 
Introduction to 
Completion 
Price/Sol to 
Completion 
Less than £5m 23 55 80 64 
£5m to £10m 32 51 107 60 
£10m to £20m 41 53 104 59 
£20m to £50m 39 56 122 64 
£50m and above 61 63 114 61 
P-value: medians are equal 0.024 0.314 0.930 0.984 
Highest price psf 38 49 96 56 
Second quartile 30 56 94 67 
Third quartile 34 57 90 67 
Lowest price psf 69 57 156 76 
P-value: medians are equal 0.165 0.399 0.006 0.013 
     
Measurements of medians are based on different sized samples. Results for introduction to price/solicitor and for 
price/solicitor to completion will not sum to time from introduction to completion. Analysis using price bands excludes 
portfolio deals. Quartiles for price per square foot are derived using prices in Q4 2012 terms as explained in main text. 
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Table 7: Purchases - Median times in days for transaction stages by type of seller 
 Introduction to 
Price/Sol 
Price/Sol to 
Completion 
Introduction to 
Completion 
UK 39 55 104 
Non-UK 63 56 132 
Unknown 26 65 102 
P-value: medians are equal 0.068 0.571 0.579 
Institution 33 49 92 
Other type 53 58 137 
Unknown 26 65 102 
P-value: medians are equal 0.001 0.063 0.028 
    
Measurements of medians are based on different sized samples. Results for introduction to 
price/solicitor and for price/solicitor to completion will not sum to time from introduction to 
completion. 
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Table 8: Cox Proportional Hazard Models – Time from Price/Solicitor Date to Completion Date 
 (1) Sales (2) Purchases (3) All data (4) All retail (5) All office 
Average price growth where < 0 0.953 *** 0.919 *** 0.948 *** 0.912 *** 0.976  
Average price growth where > 0 1.074 *** 1.072 *** 1.066 *** 1.087 *** 1.037 *** 
Portfolio deal 0.770 ** 0.795  0.809 ** 0.673 * 0.657 ** 
Sector           
  Other retail 0.801 * 0.888 * 0.852 **     
  Office 0.660 *** 0.906  0.790 ***     
  Industrial 0.733  0.601 * 0.668 ***     
Top quartile price psf 1.537 ** 1.006  1.290  1.247  1.786 *** 
Not 100% freehold 0.681 * 0.672 *** 0.632 *** 0.670 *** 0.359 *** 
UK buyer 1.271    1.340  0.933  2.156 *** 
UK seller   0.972  0.997  1.175  0.770  
Institutional buyer 1.181 ***   1.203 *** 1.061  1.836 *** 
Institutional seller   1.274 *** 1.028  1.297 ** 0.595 * 
Retail type           
  Retail park       0.844    
  Retail warehouse       1.466 ***   
  Shopping centre       0.687    
  Supermarket       0.757 ***   
Rest UK location         0.940  
No of observations 237  230  467  196  173  
χ2 361.48  6.24  191.92  388.94  1636.4  
Probability > χ2 0.0000  0.2835  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Harrell's C 0.611  0.608  0.596  0.648  0.636  
 
Notes: The table reports hazard ratios, which are derived by taking the exponential of the estimated coefficients. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The dependent variable 
equals the time in days from price/solicitor date to completion date. The omitted category for the sector dummies is standard retail and this is also the omitted category for the retail type dummies. The models 
adjust for possible correlation between observations from a given fund. 
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